On-line commercial transactions involve an inherent mistrust between participant parties since, sometimes, no previous relation exists between them. Such mistrust may be a deadlock point in a trade transaction where the buyer does not want to perform the payment until the seller sends the goods and the seller does not want to do so until the buyer pays for the purchase. In this paper we present a fair protocol for data trading where the commercial deal, in terms of delivering the data and performing the payment, is atomic, since the seller cannot redeem the payment unless the buyer obtains the data and the buyer cannot obtain the data without performing the payment. The protocol is based on Bitcoin scripting language and the fairness of the protocol can be probabilistically enforced.
Introduction
From its first uses, computer networks have been applied as a business base ground to perform commercial transactions. Obviously, on-line interactions impose some restrictions on how such transactions can be performed since there is no physical contact between the parties. One of the first problems that on-line economic transactions faces is distrustful that parts in the transaction may have on each other. When a buyer is in a regular shop buying some groceries, whether the seller will provide the groceries in a bag first or the buyer will give the money for that purchase before is irrelevant since the on-site transaction reduces the distrustful of the parts. However, if the economic transaction is on-line such situation implies a disadvantage for the party that performs the first step of the protocol. If the buyer pays before receiving the purchase, the seller could act maliciously by not sending the goods and, conversely, if the seller delivers the goods before getting paid, the buyer could disappear with the product without paying. Such situation is solved in real transactions by creating some trust relationship between buyer and seller. Such trust is somehow based on the fact that the buyer is willing to pay before the product is delivered because standard on-line payment systems, like credit cards or bank transfers, have the possibility to be reversed. So the buyer has some confidence that if something goes wrong, for instance, the product is not delivered, he could prove it, the system could reverse the payment and he would not be at a disadvantage.
However, the situation is different when blockchain based cryptocurrencies are the payment system for purchases. Blockchain based cryptocurrencies avoid the double-spending problem of digital cash systems by maintaining a general ledger in which all transactions are stored. The main property of such ledger is its immutability which makes payments final once a transaction is deep enough in the blockchain. Once the payment is firmly included in the blockchain, it is impossible to reverse such payment, unless the payee of such transaction unilaterally agrees to return the money. Such mechanism leaves the buyer in a weaker position when the payment is performed before obtaining the goods.
The best approach to solve this unequal advantage of the parties in a purchase is to set the whole transaction atomic in the sense that the payment and goods delivery takes place at the same time. With this approach, in case one of the parties does not cooperate, neither delivery nor payment are completed. In fact, such situation is the best emulation of on-site shop scenario where the payment and the delivery take place at the same time, almost atomically. Of course, translating such approach to a virtual environment implies that goods traded would be restricted to digital data.
The described scenario can be seen as a fair exchange protocol where two parties agree in the exchange of some data for a given value (in this case measured in bitcoins). Usually, fair exchange protocols can be used to sign a contract between two parties stating the conditions under which the exchange has to be carried. As we will see in Section 2, different proposals has been developed in this field and their main goal is that no party can gain advantage over the other. However, the mechanisms provided so far need to relay in a TTP with different trust levels. But in the way to reduce or avoid dependency of a TTP, the Bitcoin protocol may open a new path to implement fair exchange protocols. The main strength of Bitcoin for fair exchange protocol is twofold. On one hand, Bitcoin provides a distributed platform where complex transactions authenticated by digital signatures can be executed through smart contracts and can be enforced without the need of a TTP. On the other hand, Bitcoin itself is used as a digital currency so it is suitable when those fair exchanges include economic transactions.
The contribution of this paper is the following. We propose a fair protocol for data trading. Our protocol is fair since none of the participants have an advantageous position in the execution of the protocol. The protocol is atomic in the sense that either it is fully executed, ending the buyer with the data and the seller with the payment, or no party incurs in any loss. Our proposal is a practical one, based on Bitcoin scripting language, and can be deployed using existing technology, in contrast to other theoretical approaches that are reviewed in Section 2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the state of the art in fair exchange protocols. Section 3 provides some background on Bitcoin transactions, its scripting language and the main relevant transactions used in our protocol. In Section 4 the fair protocol for data trading is presented and its main properties analyzed. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Related work
Fair exchange protocols are usually divided into two party protocols and protocols requiring a trusted third party (TTP). Two party protocols, provide a gradual exchange of messages or information between the two parties, to gradually decrease uncertainty and increase fairness in the transaction, without the need for a TTP. First proposed in [1] , the idea is for the two parties to exchange secrets bit by bit allowing them to verify the correctness of the received bits. This idea was also proposed in other approaches [2] more specifically for the signature of contracts. Probabilistic protocols for fair exchange were introduced in [3] , where the goal is for the parties to end up with a given probability on the fairness (i.e. commitment to the contract by the two parties) at a given time (or step).
Regarding the use of a TTP, we usually distinguish between online and offline TTP. The online TTP acts as an intermediary between the two parties ensuring the fairness of the exchange [4, 5] . On the other hand an offline TTP only acts in case of dispute and does not participate in the protocol if all parts act honestly. This last approach is also called an optimistic fair exchange [6, 7, 8] .
Authors refer to the notion of perfect fairness (also called strong fair exchange) when a party cannot leave the protocol with a small advantage over the opponent [9] . Perfect fair exchange usually requires the use of TTP-based protocols, although there are several alternatives to implement it. Some of them relay in some penalty mechanism to be applied to the misbehaving parties [10] .
In [11] Bitcoin is used for the payment in an optimistic fair exchange (with a TTP) with anonymity. Most notably, Bitcoin has been proposed for fair exchange as a mean of implementing a penalty mechanism [12] . The idea is that if a party leaves the protocol with more knowledge than the rest, those honest parties are compensated. The same idea is applied to multiparty computation in [13] . Following these works, similar approaches for implementing penalty based incentives using smart contracts for several types of computations have been proposed in [14, 15, 16] . These include applications on online lottery, decentralized poker, verifiable and secure computation, and fair secure computation in general.
In our proposal, Bitcoin is used as the main mechanism to implement and enforce the fair exchange. We do not rely in the use of a TTP and instead of fairly sign a contract for the exchange of data, the contract is explicitly executed as a Bitcoin smart contract. This has the advantage that the exchange is produced, that is, the buyer gets the data and the seller the money, completely or not. In some sense we can say that the exchange is atomic. Although our approach does not achieve strong fairness, as we will show, the advantage that a party (in our case the buyer) takes by leaving the protocol can be bound by the other party.
Similarly to our proposal, [17, 18] uses Bitcoin with zero knowledge proofs to allow payments in Bitcoin subject to the disclosure of a given secret. In this case the secret is a symmetric key used to encrypt some given data. A zero knowledge proof is used (externally to Bitcoin) to prove the validity of the encrypted data and the secret key, thus providing some sort of strong fair exchange. This is only feasible if a zero knowledge proof exists and is feasible for the specific case (data). A more generic solution is outlined in [19, 20] where a symmetric key is used to encrypt chunks of data such that a subset can be revealed as a proof. As different keys are used for each chunk, revealing a subset does not ensure that the key of the other chunks is correct. As we will show, in our proposal a private key from a public key pair is revealed. This makes it easier to verify its correctness with the corresponding public key and ensures that the key is valid for all data chunks by just verifying one of them.
Bitcoin transactions background
Bitcoin transactions are usually seen as a transfer of bitcoins from a source to a destination address, in which the former can prove the ownership of such bitcoins, and thus spend them, by providing a digital signature. However, Bitcoin transactions are far more complex, and allow the creation of richer conditions that have to be met to redeem the funds [22] . Transactions may be seen, in a more general way, as a collection of inputs, containing references to previous transaction outputs, and a collection of outputs, containing the set of conditions needed to be met to redeem them. Each input of a transaction refers to an output of a previous one, where unlocking conditions have been established. Hence, each input has to contain the proof of fulfillment of the established conditions of the output it tries to redeem from.
Both unlocking conditions and proofs are coded in transactions using Script, a stack-based, not Turing-complete scripting language with no loops. In order to check the correctness of a transaction, the full script is executed by concatenating both locking and unlocking scripts, leading to a final True on the top of the stack if and only if the proof satisfies the unlocking conditions. This kind of transactions including complex unlocking scripts are also known as smart contracts. However, not every single condition can be coded nor checked using Script. A limited number of operations (opcodes) are defined in Bitcoin, bounding the variety of scripts that can be encoded using the language. Furthermore, its use is even more restricted, since not all the defined operations can actually be used. For instance, the most common script transaction within Bitcoin, the standard Pay-To-Public-Key-Hash where a digital signature is needed to redeem a transaction, is next provided:
<sig> <pubKey>
Based on the Bitcoin scripting language, multiple special-purpose transactions can be defined. In the following subsections some interesting types of transactions, that are building blocks of the proposed data trading protocol, are described.
Time locked transactions
Time locked transaction outputs are outputs that require a certain time in the future to be reached in order to be redeemed. Depending on whether the future time is absolute to Bitcoin, or relative to the transaction publishing time, two types of time-locks can be found. On the one hand, absolute time-locks, those based on the CheckLockTimeVerify opcode, establish a fixed date in the future from when the transaction can be redeemed. Down below an example of such time-lock (locked until 2022/12/13), along with a standard signature, is provided:
On the other hand, relative time-locks, those based on the CheckSequenceVerify opcode, establish an amount of time, starting from the transaction publishing time, that has to be spent to unlock the output. An example of such time-lock (locked for 25 days), together with a traditional signature, can be found as follows:
Notice that in both examples the ScriptSig, included in the transaction that will spent the output, does not contain any time reference, since the transaction creation time is used to check the time-locks. Moreover, both examples include a traditional signature lock. The reason behind this second lock is to restrict the redeemer to a single person, otherwise anyone will be able to spend the output once the requested time has been reached. Figure 1 depicts a general time locked transaction, and can be seen as a representation of any of the two introduced types. 
Private key locked transactions
Private key locked transactions [23] are another special case of Bitcoin transactions in which the transaction output can be redeemed by anyone who provides a private key corresponding to a predefined public key.
Two different approaches can be used to implement private key locked transactions, via the definition of new Bitcoin opcode or by taking advantage of a well-known vulnerability of ECDSA algorithm.
New Bitcoin opcode
One possibility to implement private key locked transactions is through the implementation of a new crypto opcode that performs precisely a matching validation between the public key and the corresponding private key: OP CHECKKEYPAIRVERIFY. The OP CHECKKEYPAIRVERIFY opcode would check whether the top two items of the stack, pubKey and privKey (corresponding, respectively, to a public key and private key), match.
With the usage of this new opcode, a transaction output could be constructed such that, in order to be redeemed, the private key matching the specified public key has to be revealed. An example 1 of the scriptPubKey of such an output together with the scriptSig needed to spend it would be:
The script will first check that the public and private keys belong to the same key pair. Note that, if the validation is successful, the stack values will remain untouched. Therefore, before checking the validity of the signature with OP CHECKSIG, privKeyA1 and pubKeyA1 have to be removed from the stack (since they are not needed for signature validation). The execution of OP 2DROP removes them from the stack. Finally, OP CHECKSIG validates the signature with the public key. If the signature is correct, the script terminates successfully.
Note that the execution of OP CHECKKEYPAIRVERIFY would fail if the validation is unsuccessful and would leave the stack as it was before if the validation is successful. This ensures the new opcode can be implemented as a soft fork modification of the Bitcoin core protocol by reusing one of the currently unused OP NOPx opcodes, in a similar way that it has been done in the past with the opcodes OP CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY (OP NOP2) and OP CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY (OP NOP3).
ECDSA vulnerability
Since the OP CHECKKEYPAIRVERIFY opcode described in the previous section is not available, another approach to build transaction outputs that require the disclosure of a specific private key to be redeemed can be taken, using a vulnerability in the ECDSA signature scheme.
ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) is the cryptographic algorithm used by Bitcoin to create and validate digital signatures. The ECDSA signature scheme is probabilistic in the sense that there exist many different valid signatures made with the same private key for the same message. Such feature is based on the selection of a specific random value k during the signature process.
There exists a well known ECDSA signature vulnerability 2 by which an attacker that observes two signatures of different messages made with the same private key is able to extract the private key if the signer reuses the same k during the signature process. Therefore, the selection of k is critical to the security of the system.
To implement private key lock transactions, we can make use of the aforementioned ECDSA vulnerability to perform targeted private key disclosure within Bitcoin. The Private key disclosure mechanism is performed by constructing transaction outputs that need to reveal a private key in order to be redeemed, in such a way that we ensure the revealed private key is the counterpart of a certain public key.
Let {P K, SK} be an ECDSA key pair belonging to Bob (with Addr(P K) the Bitcoin address associated to it) and sig prev an existing signature made with SK. Alice (that is interested in acquiring Bob's private key) needs to know the value of the previous signature sig prev , in order to be able to request, afterwards, a second signature made with the same k. In contrast with the approach followed in [23] , where the previous signature appears in the blockchain as the input script of an existing transaction, in this paper our approach is that the existing signature sig prev does not appear in the blockchain but it is sent to Alice by an off-chain exchange of values. In this case, the previous signature sig prev may be transmitted confidentially (and thus only Alice and Bob know its value). Following this approach, the signed message m does not need to correspond to a Bitcoin transaction hash.
Once an existing previous signature sig prev is known by Alice, she creates a transaction with an output that requires a second signature sig to be spent. However, instead of using the classical pay-to-pubkey-hash script, she uses a special script that forces Bob (the redeemer) not only to prove he has the private key SK associated to the given address Addr(P K) by creating a valid signature, but also to deliver a signature that has exactly the same k value that was used when creating sig prev .
Doing so accomplishes two purposes: on the one hand, Bob proves he knows the private key associated to the public key by generating a signature that correctly validates with that public key; on the other hand, Bob is implicitly revealing the private key associated to the same public key. Note that Bob does not directly provide the private key, but provides information from which the private key can be derived. Figure 2 shows a scheme of the Bitcoin transactions involved in the construction of a private key locked output. Once Alice knows the previous signature, she can construct the transaction tx 2 , that transfers some bitcoins of her property to Bob, only if Bob provides a valid signature that has the same k as the previous signature sig prev that Bob previously sent to Alice. Moreover, the output has an additional condition with a time lock allowing Alice to get a refund of her bitcoins if Bob decides not to collaborate and does not redeem tx 2 's output.
The ScriptPubKey of the output (and its corresponding ScriptSig) that implement the mechanism described above are the following:
ScriptPubKey: OP DUP <pubKey> OP CHECKSIGVERIFY OP SIZE <0x47> OP EQUALVERIFY <sigmask> OP AND <rprev> OP EQUAL ScriptSig: <sig> First, the script validates the signature against the specified public key. Then, the length of the signature is checked. Finally, a bitwise AND between the new signature and sig mask 3 is computed, and the result is compared with the k value of the previous signature. If both values are equal, the script terminates successfully; otherwise, the script terminates with a False value on the stack, making it fail.
Note that the only way to ensure that the script succeeds is by providing a valid signature that has exactly the same k as the previous signature.
Therefore, although the redeem ScriptSig that spends the output does not include the value of the private key directly, it is implicitly leaking its value by the ECDSA vulnerabilty.
Also note that the ScriptSig needed to spend the output only requires one value: the new signature.
The data trading protocol
As we have already stated, the main property of our data trading protocol is its atomicity which provides its fairness for the participants of the protocol. The proposed protocol is run by two parties, the buyer, B, and the seller, S, and no additional party, like a TTP is needed. Notice that, contrary to other fair exchange protocols [6, 7, 8] , our proposal does not define a dispute mechanism, in which some proposals also need a TTP, thanks to the atomicity of the protocol. Furthermore, since our protocol is based on bitcoins, both parties need to be connected with the Bitcoin network to send/receive transactions from the blockchain.
In our scenario, the buyer, B, wants to buy some data D to the seller, S, and he is willing to pay x bitcoins for such data. In order to minimize any possible advantage of one of the parties, we consider that the data being sold can be divided in n different parts and each of those parts may have a meaning by itself. Notice that this scenario is not as restrictive as it would appear since multiple data falls into this category. On one hand, many multimedia data has the desired properties. For instance, movies or songs can be sliced and each slice may be recognized as part of the whole performance. The buyer may be interested in adquiring the full movie or song, and would be able to verify that it is indeed correct by just watching or listening to a few segments. Datasets consisting on multiple images may also be partitioned, so that each individual image is one of the parts. The images can be individually verified, and then the full dataset can be sold. Just to name a specific example, one may be interested in buying a dataset of images of historic monuments, and may be able to check the correctness of the dataset by verifing that a sample of the images are indeed photographies of monuments. On the other hand, when dealing with sensor data, some sensing values may provide evidence that the sensing is correct but the whole sensing data could be needed for specific purposes. For instance, a temperature sensor may record samples every hour. A buyer may be interested in adquiring the sensor data for a full month, for sensors in a given country. By checking a few samples, the buyer may verify they match the expected values, and decide to buy the whole dataset in order to perform the desired analysis.
Protocol description
The full protocol, depicted in Figure 3 , can be divided in three main parts: the Data correctness proof, in which a cut & choose protocol between B and S is performed in order to convince B that the acquired data is correct; the Signature commitment, used by B to obtain a previous signature performed by S with the private key used to encrypt the data; and the Private Key Exchange, used to exchange, atomically, the private key that allows to decrypt the sold information for the agreed amount of bitcoins.
In the following paragraphs, we describe in detail each subprotocol. We denote by {P K, SK} a public key pair and E P K (·) the encryption function using the public key.
In the Data correctness proof subprotocol, the buyer B starts the protocol by requesting data to the seller S. In such first step, B will indicate to S the data he is willing to buy. Such request will include the conditions, cond, that the data being sold have to hold. Such conditions need to hold not only for the complete data being sold but also for each of the sliced part of the data 4 . Upon reception, S generates a new key pair {P K, SK} and sends B the following information (see Step 2 in Figure 3) : the public key P K, the requested data D encrypted using P K, and the data price x. In order to allow B to prove the data correctness, S does not send the D as a whole bunch of encrypted data, but split in n chunks which are encrypted individually (as shown in Figure 4 ), that is:
When B receives all the encrypted data, he requests a correctness proof to S consisting in a random subset of non-encrypted data from D. To that end, B selects the subset by randomly choosing a set of m pieces from the encrypted dataset, that is i j ∀j ∈ [0, m − 1], i j ∈ [0, n − 1]. B sends this information and S can build the correctness proof by choosing the unencrypted pieces of data that matches the received indexes, that is, Step 1
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Figure 3: Fair data trading protocol. Once B has received the proof he verifies the correctness of D by checking that the proof satisfies the conditions. Furthermore, B validates that the received data also matches with the subset of received encrypted data, by recreating the data encryption using P K. Therefore, since the subset has been randomly chosen by B, the correctness of the full dataset can be proved with a given probability. Section 4.3 analyzes in depth the impact of the parameters of the scheme on such probability.
Once the data correctness has been proven, the Signature commitment subprotocol is performed. B requests a signature sig prev over a nonce message performed with the private key SK generated by S. S sends sig prev and B validates that the signature is correct, using the public key P K that has received in Step 2 of the Data Correctness Proof subprotocol.
Finally, the Private Key Exchange subprotocol is performed. In such subprotocol, B builds a private key locked transaction, tx 1 , to perform the atomic exchange between the private key, SK, and the bitcoin price x. Such private key locked transaction is built using the technique described in Section 3.2 and also adding another time constrain condition following the details of Section 3.1. Such time constrain is used for B to recover the amount of x bitcoins in case S decides not to reveal the private key by not spending the received transaction. B broadcasts the transaction tx 1 to the Bitcoin P2P network. Once tx 1 is included in a block, S can spend the output of such transaction with an input of a new transaction tx 2 in which S will provide the second signature with the same k of sig prev . Once tx 2 appears on the blockchain, B will be able to recover the private key SK (following the details of Section 3.2) and decrypt the data E P K (D) he received in Step 2 to retrieve the purchased data.
Implementation details
In the protocol description provided in the previous section some implementation details have been deliberately omitted to allow a better under-standing of the general protocol. In this section, we provide some comments regarding such specific details.
Privacy protection
First of all, sensitive information exchanged in the protocol should be protected from third parties. For instance, if an attacker could retrieve the information transmitted in Step 2 and in Step 7, later on, with the knowledge of tx 2 (which is publicly available in the blockchain), he would be able to decrypt the information and retrieve the original data D. To avoid such situation, information transmitted on Steps 2 and 7 could be encrypted using the public key of B, that could be sent to S in Step 1. Furthermore, in Step 4, some part of the data is transmitted in clear for validation purposes. In this case, an external attacker could also obtain such information. Again, such situation can be avoided by encrypting the information of Step 4 in the same way we just described for Steps 2 and 7.
Data encryption mechanism
As it is well known, public key cryptography is not suitable for encrypting large files due to its poor performance. Then, since the size of the data chunks that are encrypted and transmitted in Step 2 can vary depending of the traded data, we suggest to use digital envelopes to encrypt D. Digital envelopes [24] protect the message by using a two layer encryption in which the data itself is encrypted using symmetric encryption, and then the symmetric key is encrypted using public-key cryptography. Following such an approach, for each chunk i of data created from D, D i , a symmetric key k i is also generated. D i will be encrypted using k i , that is C i = E k i (D i ) and k i will then be encrypted using P K, that is, c i = E P K (k i ). Thus, each encrypted chunk of data D i sent by S to B during Step 2 should be replaced by
Furthermore, when sending the correctness proof, S will include the corresponding symmetric encryption keys k i ∀i ∈ 0, ..., m−1. Finally, B will need to undo the digital envelope process in Step 5 in order to perform all the required verifications, and also in Step 12, when finally decrypts D.
Script building
The private key locked transaction used in the secret key exchange subprotocol, tx 1 also includes a time lock condition to allow B to refund his x bitcoins in case S decides not correctly follow the last step of the protocol. 
Protocol costs
The proposed data trading protocol has a cost in terms of data transferred between the two parties. On the one hand, two Bitcoin transactions are involved in any exchange using our protocol. On the other hand, there is an offchain exchange of messages between the buyer and the seller, that transfers the data being sold together with some additional information needed for the protocol.
Regarding the Bitcoin transactions, both will be sent to the Bitcoin P2P network and will eventually be included into the blockchain. Transactions tx 1 and tx 2 (see Figure 3) are, respectively, 397 and 191-byte long. Therefore, the bandwidth cost of sending both transactions to the P2P network is negligible. Bitcoin transactions may include fees, that incentivize miners into including them in the block they are mining. At the time of writing (beginning of July 2017), the total fees that should be paid are $1.39.
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Regarding the offchain data exchanged between the two parties, the lower bound for transferred data is obviously defined by the sold data D size. Let us analyse the overhead introduced by the protocol. First, there is a fixed overhead produced by the exchange of fixed-length protocol data, such as public keys and signatures. This fixed cost will be the same for all exchanges, independently of the amount of data being sold or the chosen parameters.
Second, there is a variable overhead, that depends on the parameters of the scheme. Specifically, it depends on the number of chunks the data is divided into and the percentage of chunks revealed during the data correctness proof. Figure 5 analyses how these two parameters affect the overall amount of data exchanged offchain between the two parties. Increasing the number of chunks the data is divided into increases the transferred data size in a constant fashion (Figure 5a ). The reason is that each chunk has a fixed overhead produced by the usage of the digital envelope. On the contrary, increasing the percentage of chunks revealed increases the transferred amount linearly with the data size (Figure 5b ). Of course, the bigger the data, the higher is the increase produced by augmenting the percentage of chunks revealed. The overhead produced by our protocol is mostly generated by the cut-and-choose mechanism.
Protocol fairness discussion
The main objective of the proposed protocol is to achieve fairness in the sense that neither B nor S would have any advantage in the protocol. By advantage we mean that B cannot obtain the data without paying x bitcoins and S cannot obtain the bitcoins without revealing the data. The Data Correctness Proof subprotocol ensures that S cannot sell fake data. Without B verifying parts of the encrypted data, S could encrypt fake data and when S obtains the bitcoins in tx 2 and B the decryption key, B will learn that he was cheated but it will be too late since S already has the bitcoins.
In the following paragraphs, we will show how the buyer B is probabilistically protected against deception by using a cut-and-choose mechanism. Furthermore, the level of protection may be adjusted by fixing the ratio of chunks revealed on Step 2.
In the main steps of the Data Correctness Proof subprotocol:
1. S encrypts each of the n chunks of data with a public key P K and commits to the ciphered chunks by sending them to B. 2. B chooses a subset of m chunks and asks S to reveal the original data corresponding to those chunks. 3. B validates the received chunks by checking both that the original data meets the specified conditions and that the encryption of the original data is equal to the committed values.
We say that a seller S successfully deceives a buyer B if the seller is able to include b corrupted chunks of data within the n traded chunks without the buyer noticing it after having validated the m revealed chunks (that is, after finishing the Data Correctness Proof subprotocol). The probability Ω of S successfully deceiving B is given by the following equation:
counts the number of ways of choosing m elements from a set of n elements. We are interested in knowing how many of those ways include at least one corrupted chunk. We compute this value by counting the number of ways of selecting m elements with exactly i of them being corrupt and summing them up for all possible i values. . The summation gives the probability of selecting at least one corrupted chunk within the m revealed, that is, the probability of detecting a fraud. Therefore, the probability of deception is the complement. Figure 6 shows the probability of deception Ω for different ratios of chunks revealed, m n , and different number of corrupted chunks included by the seller, b, for n = 1 000. Note that, even when the checked chunks ratio is low, the probability of successfully deceiving a buyer is low whenever b is over a certain threshold. For instance, when 20% of the chunks are checked, the probability of deception is 0.8 if the seller includes just 0.1% of corrupted chunks (b = 1, red dot on Fig. 6 ). However, if the seller includes 1% of corrupted chunks (b = 10), the probability of successfully deceiving the buyer decreases to 0.106 (green dot on Fig. 6 ). When using the proposed data selling protocol, the two parties (buyer and seller) agree on the value of the parameter m. Therefore, the buyer can decide beforehand whether or not to buy a given dataset depending on the deception risk he is willing to assume. Buyers will be interested in using high m values, since these offer higher levels of protection. Of course, even honest sellers will prefer low m values, since if the client does not finally buy the data, m data chunks end up being revealed for free.
It is worth mention that a malicious buyer could try to get advantage of the protocol by executing it with different identities (trying to perform a sybil attack) buying the same product or even colluding with other buyers. Multiple executions of the Data correctness proof could potentially provide attackers with all the chucks of decrypted data. To avoid such situation, the ordering of the encrypted chunks {E P K (D 0 ), E P K (D 1 ), ..., E P K (D n−1 )} used in the data correctness proof protocol is randomly chosen for each buyer, so the probability that the buyer (or a coalition) obtains all the chunks decrypted can be minimized by increasing the value n. Note that given two different encrypted sets of data, an attacker would not be able to know the correspondence between each data chunk in both sets.
As an example, let us consider a certain seller S that sells a dataset divided in n = 1 000 chunks. The buyer may allow to accept, at most, 5% of corrupted chunks in his purchased data, and the seller does not want neither to reveal in the Step 2 more than the 5% of the chunks. With this configuration, if we analyze the probability Ω for b = 50 (the 5% of the 1 000 chunks), Ω(50, 1 000, 50) ≈ 0.072 the buyer can be sure that the seller cannot cheat with a probability greater 1 − 0.072 = 0.928. Of course, if the buyer does not have any trust in the seller, he could force the seller to reveal 10% of chunks instead of only 5% in Step 2. With this settings, the buyer knows that the probability the seller cheats is almost negligible, less than a 0.004.
Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a fair data trading protocol based on Bitcoin transactions. The protocol uses a new type of transactions, the private key locked transaction, that provide an atomic way of exchanging a private key for Bitcoins. Such key is used to encrypt all the traded data, and will be traded, as a part of a Bitcoin smart contract, only when the two parties agree. The correctness of the data sold using the protocol is verifiable by the buyer before performing the transaction by checking a small random subset of data. By using such a cut-and-choose technique, deception is avoided with a high probability while only a small part of the information is learned by the buyer.
The protocol can be implemented by using the recently proposed private key locked transaction and exchanging a few messages between the parties involved in the process, making it easy to deploy. Moreover, it lays on the security measures Bitcoin provides, without introducing more complexity, and it is bound to the computational capabilities of the Bitcoin Scripting language.
We believe that, since there is no need of any other entity, like a TTP, to implement the protocol, it could be easily deployed to provide an additional security layer in the process of data trading using Bitcoins, reducing the trust the involved parties have to share among them, and promoting the use of such a currency for trading with non-physical goods. The application of such a protocol covers a wide range of topics, from general interest data, such as songs, pictures or movies, to even specific purpose data, such as data sensing readings. The integration of such a data trading in data sensing scenarios could provide a secure way of data correctness verification, reducing users misbehaving ratio and optimizing the rewarding system.
